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Abstract. Theological attention to the Catholic doctrine of original sin has a history that 
extends from the letters of Saint Paul through the Council of Trent and Pius XII’s 1950 
encyclical, Humani generis. The doctrine has traditionally been articulated through the 
Genesis narrative of Adam and Eve as the first human beings from whom all others 
descend, an account known as monogenism. In the course of the nineteenth century, 
scientific research into human origins increasingly invoked polygenism, the descent of 
humanity from non-human ancestors through a transitional population. Subsequent 
Catholic engagement with evolution included resistance to polygenism from the Vati-
can due to a perceived conflict with the doctrine of original sin. Humani generis included 
a prohibition that remains in place today in spite of widespread de facto acceptance 
of polygenism among theologians. Understanding the origin and persistence of this 
disparity stands to benefit from comparison to a corresponding ambivalence toward the 
sixteenth century Copernican hypothesis of a moving earth, only conclusively resolved 
in 1992. In Part I of this essay I introduce this historical comparison and describe the 
origins of monogenism and polygenism terminology in nineteenth century debate over 
the unity of the human race. I then describe the conceptual changes that transpired 
during the first half of the twentieth century and the resulting role of polygenism in 
the nouvelle théologie of the decade prior to Humani generis. Subsequent developments 
and implications follow in Part II.
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Introduction
Some of the most theologically and culturally influential passages in Genesis 
describe an act of disobedience by Adam and Eve now commonly referred 
to as original sin. Saint Paul left a lasting legacy for theology by presenting 
a symmetry between the impact of one man’s sin and the redemptive power 
of the one Christ:
For if, by the transgression of one person, death came to reign through that 
one, how much more will those who receive the abundance of grace and of the 
gift of justification come to reign in life through the one person Jesus Christ. 
In conclusion, just as through one transgression condemnation came upon all, 
so through one righteous act acquittal and life came to all (Romans 5:17–18).
This attribution of responsibility for sin and its consequences to a single 
individual became central to subsequent theological exposition. Most 
influentially, in response to the theological turmoil of the Reformation, the 
Council of Trent (1545–1563) issued a decree on original sin that included 
responses to a set of doctrines, collectively labelled Pelagian, which, in their 
most extreme form, denied hereditary sin altogether (Endres 1967). Canon 
One from Trent Session Five included an oft quoted passage.
If any one does not confess that the first man, Adam, when he had transgressed 
the commandment of God in Paradise, immediately lost the holiness and justice 
wherein he had been constituted; and that he incurred, through the offence 
of that prevarication, the wrath and indignation of God, and consequently 
death, with which God had previously threatened him […] let him be anathema 
(Council of Trent 1546).
The decree further asserted that “this sin of Adam, –which in its origin is one 
(origine unum), and being transfused into all by propagation (propagatione), 
not by imitation (imitatione), is in each one as his own.” Additional theo-
logical reflection is needed to determine whether these references to Adam 
as “the first man” might be implicit or co-defined by the doctrine at stake 
or are simply a non-doctrinal mode of expression. Until the mid-twentieth 
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century, the preferred interpretation was that this phrase, used together 
with the terminology propagatione and origine unum, implies a unique sinful 
act with effects that are transmitted to all humanity through direct physical 
descent from Adam, the first human.
Scrutiny of this traditional reading intensified following the application 
of evolutionary biology to human origins. During the first half of the twen-
tieth century, the evolution of the human body from non-human ancestors 
became increasingly acceptable to Catholics as long as the divine introduc-
tion of individual human souls was acknowledged. However, in a famous 
passage in the 1950 encyclical Humani generis, Pope Pius XII warned that, 
although the bodily evolution of humanity was a viable scientific topic in 
general, some specific evolutionary theories do conflict with the doctrine 
of original sin.
Christians cannot lend their support to a theory which involves the existence, 
after Adam’s time, of some earthly race of men, truly so called, who were not 
descended ultimately from him, or else supposes that Adam was the name given 
to some group of our primordial ancestors. It does not appear how such a view 
can be reconciled with the doctrine of original sin, as this is guaranteed to us 
by Scripture and tradition, and proposed to us by the Church (Knox 1950, 190).
The ideas Pius castigated are commonly referred to collectively as polygen-
ism and stand in contrast to monogenism, the attribution of human origins 
to a single pair of individuals. Given the longstanding reluctance by the 
Vatican to issue official pronouncements on scientific topics, it is natural to 
wonder why Pius singled out polygenism for special attention. His warning 
certainly did not settle the issue. Discussion increased during the 1950s, 
Vatican II, and through the 1960s. As late as 2003, when Kevin McMahon 
wrote “Monogenism and Polygenism” for The New Catholic Encyclopedia, 
he presented the topic as still unresolved. 
The present situation amounts to a quandary for theologians. On the one hand, 
even though it has not been formally addressed by the magisterium since Humani 
generis, monogenism continues to be accepted as a basic premise in Church 
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teaching, as is shown by the relevant sections of the The Catechism of the Catholic 
Church (nn. 374–379, 390, 399–407). On the other hand, to deny the polygenistic 
origin of the human species places the theologian in clear opposition with 
science, and conjures up the image of an obscurantist faith combating the truth 
of reason. And yet it may very well prove to be that science, in its forthright 
drive for empirical knowledge, has only forced theology to deeper reflection 
on its own central claim that Christ lies at the heart of all (McMahon 2003).
The goal of the present paper is to clarify how this longstanding “quandary” 
took root and became established. In the tradition of drawing comparisons 
between Catholic responses to evolution and heliocentrism, it is tempting 
to construct an analogy using Galileo and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin as 
protagonists. Although that exercise might be informative, it ultimately 
loses traction because for polygenism there is no iconic public event of 
comparable notoriety when measured against the trial of Galileo. Instead 
of placing a focus on a representative individual, the present paper has 
a broader conceptual basis.
In Part I, after using as a starting point the seventeenth century Catholic 
hierarchy’s defense of geostatic astronomy, I document the analogous 
history of monogenism up to 1950. In both cases, with very little public 
direction from the Vatican, scientifically informed theologians encouraged 
a gradual transition away from earlier orthodox expectations. In 1661, in 
concession to some of the arguments of Copernicus, Galileo and Kepler, 
the Jesuit Giovanni Battista Riccioli granted that the sun was the center of 
some planetary orbits but he still rejected terrestrial motion and proposed 
that the sun orbited the stationary earth. Similarly, as the century after 
Darwin progressed, the descent with modification of “systematic species” 
was accepted by most Catholic theologians as a long process spanning many 
millions of years of earth history. However, in addition to the requirement 
of divine intervention for the introduction of each human soul, what was 
consistently rejected was polygenism, the idea that humanity originated 
through a transitional population rather than from two individuals. And, 
just as preference for Riccioli’s geostatic model gave way to an acceptance 
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of a moving earth, monogenism gradually was de facto supplanted by poly-
genism. From the extensive sources available, I concentrate on the French 
literature where discussion of evolutionary topics pertaining to original sin 
was embedded within the nouvelle théologie that immediately preceded the 
publication of Humani generis.
In Part II, the discussion continues through the publication of Humani 
generis, Vatican II and the 1960s, when many theologians developed con-
ceptualizations of original sin independent of monogenism. Acceptance 
of biological polygenism became widespread, even if not condoned by any 
official Vatican pronouncement. In other cases, monogenism and polygenism 
were reconceptualized using a spiritual rather than a biological criterion. 
Reflection on the Vatican’s long period of ambivalence with respect to 
the motion of earth suggests that a similar prospect can be foreseen for 
polygenism even as the concept at stake continues to evolve.
1. Catholicism and Geostasis
As would later be the case for polygenism, Copernicus’s hypothesis that 
the earth moves in a heliocentric orbit generated widespread theological 
concern over apparent conflict with scriptural passages. One of the most 
frequently cited sources for biblically based arguments that the earth is 
stationary was Joshua 10:12–13, in which Joshua successfully prays for 
extended daylight during a military battle.
On this day, when the LORD delivered up the Amorites to the Israelites, Joshua 
prayed to the LORD, and said in the presence of Israel: Stand still, O sun, at 
Gibeon, O moon, in the valley of Aijalon! And the sun stood still, and the moon 
stayed, while the nation took vengeance on its foes.
In the sixteenth century, the most straightforward reading of this text 
included the idea that the earth is immobile and it is the motion of the sun 
that either stops or continues. Contentious Reformation arguments over the 
proper assignment of authority for biblical interpretation were fully engaged 
8(2)/2020100
J A M E S R. H O F M A N N
when Copernicus published in 1543. Although astronomy was not explicitly 
discussed at the Council of Trent, theological concern motivated Catholic 
preference for Tycho Brahe’s 1588 geostatic model in which all the planets 
have solar orbits while the sun orbits a stationary earth. Tycho’s model 
did not conflict with scripture and could also accommodate high profile 
empirical phenomena, such as Copernicus’ discovery of the correlation of 
planetary distances with periods of rotation around the sun and Galileo’s 
later observations of a full range of phases for Venus. It also avoided the 
most glaring scientific problem for the Copernican model, the failure to 
observe any stellar parallax due to the earth’s alleged annual orbit of the 
sun. In 1616, under the authority of Pope Paul V, two propositions taken from 
Copernican astronomy were submitted to consultors of the Congregation 
of the Holy Office for judgment on their theological legitimacy.
I. The sun is the center of the world and completely immovable by local motion.
II. The earth is not the center of the world, nor immovable, but moves according 
to the whole of itself, and also with diurnal motion (Langford 1966, 89).
The consultors found the first proposition to be “formally heretical” (directly 
contrary to a doctrine of faith based in scripture), while the second was 
declared “erroneous in the faith” (a conclusion contrary to scripture because 
it is inferred from the formally heretical claim that the sun is stationary). The 
Congregation’s 1616 decree conflated these two assessments and rendered 
judgement on the compound idea that the sun is immobile and the earth 
moves. It was not declared heretical but was deemed “false and contrary to 
Holy Scripture” (Langford 1966, 98–99; Finocchiaro 2005, 18). Copernicus’ 
book was also “suspended until corrected”; his model could be discussed 
and taught as a mathematical hypothesis for computational purposes, but 
it could not be defended as a thesis of physical truth.
Jesuits such as Orazio Grassi encouraged further research in Tychonic 
astronomy based upon observations that comets were accompanied by no 
observable parallax and must be celestial rather than atmospheric phenome-
na (Gal and Chen-Morris 2013, 91–101). Giovanni Battista Riccioli presented 
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the most famous of these geostatic models in his 1651 Almagestum novum 
astronomiam veterem et novem complectens. Riccioli compiled and evaluated 
forty-nine arguments in favor of a moving earth and seventy-seven counte-
rarguments for a geostatic model; he concluded that neither set of arguments 
was absolutely compelling and he advised acceptance of a stationary earth 
in accordance with the consensus of scriptural interpretation. Riccioli only 
revised Brahe’s model slightly by having Jupiter and Saturn orbit the earth 
rather than the sun. 1651 was also the year in which Francesco Piccolomini 
issued the Ordinatio pro studiis superioribus during his brief tenure as 
Jesuit superior general. The Ordinatio included a list of philosophical and 
theological theses that could not be taught in Jesuit schools (Hellyer 2005, 
38–46). Points thirty-five and thirty-six prohibited instruction that the 
firmament is stationary and the earth is in motion.1 Although Riccioli’s 1651 
text would have been completed prior to any exposure he might have had 
to this Ordinatio, he became more adamantly opposed to the Copernican 
model thereafter. Historian Alfredo Dinis has argued that Riccioli was not 
a “secret Copernican” and was sincere in his conclusion that because the 
issue could not be objectively resolved purely on the basis of empirical 
evidence, the model in conformity with traditional Biblical interpretation 
was to be preferred (Dinis 2002). Meanwhile, Galileo’s failure to conform to 
the 1616 directive of the Holy Office had resulted in his 1632 trial where he 
was found guilty of vehement suspicion of heresy on two counts: believing 
in the earth’s heliocentric mobility, the doctrine judged in 1616 to be false 
and contrary to scripture, and secondly, believing that such a doctrine could 
be held and defended as probable (Langford 1966, 152; Finocchiaro 2005, 
11–14). Vehement suspicion of heresy was a serious offense, ranking below 
only formal heresy and strong suspicion of heresy in severity. That Galileo 
was found guilty of a mode of heresy for holding a doctrine that was not 
itself ever declared heretical, but only contrary to scripture, would be one 
of the complicating factors in the historical legacy of the case.
1 The full Latin text of the Ordinatio is provided in Bargiel 2006, 263–267.
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Catholic disengagement from geostasis was a slow and convoluted 
process. It was not until 1757 that the Congregation of the Index dropped 
its longstanding prohibition of “all books teaching the earth’s motion and 
the sun’s immobility” (Finocchiaro 2005, 138–139). Books by Copernicus, 
Galileo, and Kepler remained on the Index of Prohibited Books until they 
were quietly removed for the 1835 edition. Finally, in 1981 Pope John Paul II 
authorized a committee of scholars from the Pontifical Academy of Sciences 
to investigate the Galileo affair anew. Cardinal Paul Poupard presented his 
summary of the results in a 1992 speech. 
It is in that historical and cultural framework, far removed from our own times, 
that Galileo’s judges, incapable of dissociating faith from an age-old cosmology, 
believed, quite wrongly, that the adoption of the Copernican revolution, in fact 
not yet definitively proven, was such as to undermine Catholic tradition, and 
that it was their duty to forbid its being taught (Poupard 2003, 348). 
The sporadic and drawn-out nature of the acceptance of the earth’s mobility 
should be kept in mind as we turn to the history of polygenism. That the 
earth moves in a solar orbit obviously became the de facto understanding of 
Catholic scientists and theologians long before 1992. Riccioli’s model played 
a temporary role in this transition. He acknowledged that the earth is not 
the center of all planetary motion but he also believed it to be stationary 
due to his understanding of scripture. Similarly, many aspects of evolu-
tionary science, including the evolution of the human body, have become 
theologically viable as long as monogenism is retained. But for most modern 
theologians polygenism has lost its theologically threatening status and has 
been relegated to the scientific domain along with the motion of the earth. 
As the following survey will document, monogenism has had a historical 
trajectory analogous to geostasis but with a future still to be determined.
2. Nineteenth Century Racial Polygenism 
In what would become a longstanding terminological problem, the general 
nineteenth century import of “polygenism” was that there were multiple 
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very ancient origins for distinct human races that some adherents believed 
to be separate species. Monogenism was the contrary view that racial 
distinctions are insignificant compared to the unity humanity owes to its 
singular origin. Both labels included multiple versions, some with religious 
motivation and others purely secular. Racial polygenism flourished in the 
United States, London, and Edinburgh before being extensively taken up 
by French authors. Historians Adrian Desmond and James Moore have 
located the terms monogenism and polygenism used in this racial sense 
by George Gliddon as early as 1857 (Desmond and Moore 2009, 287–289). 
Prior to Gliddon’s explicit use of this terminology, American slave owners 
had already relied upon a variety of polygenetic concepts as justification for 
slavery. In response, James Cowles Prichard used a biblical argument for the 
unity of humanity due to descent from a single ancestor. This reliance upon 
Genesis allowed racists such as Josiah Nott to claim the mantle of science 
and belittle monogenists as religiously biased and culturally backward. In 
his 1830 Thoughts on the Original Unity of the Human Race, Charles Caldwell 
claimed that Caucasians, Mongolians, Africans, and American Indians were 
created as separate populations and were easily recognized as distinct 
species (Desmond and Moore 2009, 152–154). He worried that, if it was 
accepted that races were truly descended from a recent common ancestor, 
then the same conclusion might be drawn for other sets of animal or plant 
varieties. For Caldwell, extensive common descent thus became part of 
a reduction ad absurdum argument against monogenism. From his prestigious 
position at Harvard, Louis Agassiz also asserted separate creation of races 
and incorporated racial polygenism into his biogeographical hypothesis of 
multiple zones of creation for disjoint sets of plants and animals (Agassiz 
1850). One obvious problem for all racial polygenists was that reputable 
experts repeatedly documented fertile cross breeding and it was difficult 
to discount all of these as isolated exceptions.
A prominent Catholic opponent of racial polygenism in America was 
Clarence Augustus Walworth, a Redemptorist priest and subsequent Paulist. 
Walworth rejected both polygenism and evolution but, of the two ideas, he 
considered polygenism to be the greater threat to Catholic doctrine. This 
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judgment was not unusual; as historian William Astore comments, for 
American Catholics during the 1845–1859 period, “Polygenism – not geology 
or evolutionary theories – emerged as the most significant issue” (Astore 
1996, 41). Walworth felt evolution could be rejected on scientific grounds 
and he argued for a compatibility of geology with a metaphorical or spiritual 
reading of Genesis and a localized Noachian flood. Racial polygenism was not 
so readily dismissed; here his objection was theologically motivated since he 
did not consider polygenism compatible with a traditional interpretation of 
Adam and Eve. Walworth proposed sudden saltations guided by providence 
as a cause for distinct races within the one human species descended from 
the initial couple (Walworth 1863, 332–366). 
Support for racial polygenism waned in the United States after the Civil 
War but it continued to find a scientific voice in Europe. Karl Vogt asserted 
that human races took their origins from separate ancestral species and 
evolved in parallel to the point where they were capable of some interbreeding 
(Bowler 1986, 132). As did most racial polygenists, he relied upon an extreme 
degree of convergent evolution to make interbreeding possible. Ernst Haeckel 
was also a polygenist with respect to human origins due to his belief that 
races emerged through independent achievements of language in isolated 
populations; he certainly did not think that divine intervention played any 
role (Richards 2008, 259–260). Haeckel serves as a transitional figure in the 
present discussion because he introduced much of the relevant terminology 
employed during the twentieth century. In particular, by 1866 he was using 
the word “phylon”, in the sense of “stem”, as a root for terms such as mo-
nophyletic (monophyletischer) and polyphyletic (polyphyletischer) (Richards 
2008, 138–139). He incorporated this vocabulary into his contrast between 
two general scenarios for the evolutionary history of life (Haeckel 1876, 2: 45).
The unitary, or monophyletic, hypothesis of descent will endeavor to trace the first 
origin of all individual groups of organisms, as well as their totality, to a single 
common species of Moneron which originated by spontaneous generation. The 
multiple, or polyphyletic, hypothesis of descent, on the other hand, will assume 
that several different species of Monera have arisen by spontaneous generation, 
and that these gave rise to several different main classes (tribes, or phyla).
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Although he was a polygenist with respect to human races, Haeckel ten-
tatively preferred the monophyletic hypothesis for the full history of life 
since its first inception; he did leave open the possibility of polyphyletism 
involving multiple independent cases of spontaneous generation (Dayrat 
2003). This monophyletic and polyphyletic terminology would be incorpo-
rated into Catholic literature with divine intervention replacing Haeckel’s 
use of spontaneous generation.
American, British, and German arguments all contributed to the con-
text in which racial monogenism and polygenism were debated in France 
(Blanckaert 1996). Among French anthropologists, Paul Broca and Georges 
Pouchet espoused racial polygenism during the 1860s. Broca was especially 
influential through his establishment of the Société d’anthropologie de 
Paris in 1859, the journal Revue d’anthropologie in 1872, and the Ecole d’an-
thropologie de Paris in 1875. His vigorously anti-religious and anti-clerical 
tone contributed to a widely perceived antagonism between materialistic 
anthropology and Catholicism. Pouchet adopted the American terms mo-
nogenism and polygenism with the latter defined as recognizing “no direct 
relationship among the races of mankind” (Pouchet 1864, 3). Distancing 
himself from any reliance upon scriptural authority, Pouchet accepted 
the fertile interbreeding of human races but discounted it as a secondary 
phenomenon. Neither Broca nor Pouchet provided any theoretical basis or 
mechanism for the evolution of distinct races. 
At the end of the nineteenth century, Jean Guibert was noteworthy for 
his well-informed and even-handed discussion of tenable Catholic enga-
gement with biology and paleontology. An ordained priest of the Society of 
Saint Sulpice, Guibert wrote for the benefit of his students at the Séminaire 
d’Issy where he taught natural sciences (Guibert 1896). Jean Bouyssonie 
and Henri Breuil were among his students there and they would become 
important figures in French anthropology and paleontology. Guibert referred 
to Dalmace Leroy and John Zahm hesitantly, but more or less approvingly, 
even though he knew that objections to human evolution from the Vatican 
had resulted in Leroy’s agreement to discontinue publication (Guibert 1900, 
148, 169 and 200). Leroy had speculated that evolutionary processes alone 
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might produce the initial bodies which became fully human through divine 
infusion of souls. Guibert’s more careful references to “several primitive 
forms” (Guibert 1900, 169) resembled Erich Wasmann’s later use of “natural 
species,” taxa tentatively thought to have been produced through divine 
intervention with no prior ancestry. Regarding human origins, Guibert 
distinguished his view from Leroy’s by proposing that “science itself inclines 
us to believe that the Creator at the moment in which He resolved to form 
man fashioned him directly or at least consummated and crowned the 
organism He was about to vivify by the spiritual soul” (Guibert 1900, 210). 
Leroy preferred the hypothesis that no final intervention of this kind into the 
process of physical evolution was necessary. Guibert’s discussion of human 
races concentrated on the refutation of racial polygenism and he did not 
discuss possible human descent from a non-human population. He cited 
Jean Louis Armand de Quatrefages as Agassiz’s chief opponent in France 
and marshalled many of his arguments to find flaws in polygenist claims. 
Guibert concluded that “The problem of the unity of the human origin 
seems now made quite clear. We consider the thesis as scientifically proved, 
which affirms that all the human races descended from one and the same 
primitive couple (Guibert 1900, 251). Guibert’s wording was representative 
of Catholic conviction that God’s intervention into human origins involved 
the single couple described in Genesis. 
At some far distant period of which science cannot determine the date, but 
which apparently does not exceed 18,000 or 20,000 years, the first human pair 
appeared on the earth, their nature formed and decided by a superior power 
intellectual and personal whom we call God (Guibert 1900, 377).
At the turn of the twentieth century, Guibert’s racial monogenism was an 
accepted Catholic position. Racial polygenism was uniformly held to be in 
clear contradiction with the biblical account of a single locus for human 
origins in Adam and Eve. Although extensive evolution of plant and animal 
life was allowed, the manner in which God’s intervention resulted in the 
first human beings was less settled. The human soul was necessarily held 
to be supernaturally introduced and could not be considered a product of 
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material evolution. It was also considered rash to speculate that the bodies 
into which human souls were initially introduced were solely the result of 
evolutionary processes. Conformity to these expectations was primarily 
maintained by communications from the Congregation of the Index, often 
conveyed through the superiors of religious orders (Artigas et al 2006; Paul 
1979). There certainly were influential individuals within the Roman curia 
who took broader exception to evolution in general and it is not surprising 
that these issues were scrutinized anew as the twentieth century opened.
3. Early Twentieth Century Prelude to Humani generis
On June 30 of 1909, the Pontifical Biblical Commission published a decree 
on Genesis 1–3, a document that would cast a long shadow over the first 
half of the twentieth century. The decree rendered judgment on a set of 
dubia, theses to which it responded either positively or negatively with no 
explanatory comments. The Commission prohibited the third dubium that 
included several aspects of human origins: 
In particular may the literal historical sense be called in doubt in the case of 
facts narrated in the same chapters which touch the foundations of the Christian 
religion: as are, among others, the creation of all things by God in the beginning 
of time; the special creation of man; the formation of the first woman from the 
first man; the unity of the human race (Pontifical Biblical Commission 1909).
The reference to a “special creation of man” (peculiaris creatio hominis) did 
allow for some latitude in interpretation as long as doubt was not cast upon 
the “literal historical sense” of the Genesis account. In thorough keeping with 
a conservative reading, Xavier-Marie le Bachelet wrote the article “Adam” 
for the Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique (Le Bachelet 1909). Le Bachelet 
was a Jesuit professor of dogmatic theology at Ore House in Hastings where 
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin briefly was one of his students. Never departing 
in the slightest from the conviction that Adam was a single individual and 
the “father of the human race,” Le Bachelet also cited an extensive literature 
addressing the location of Adam’s death and burial at an age of 930 years, 
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while acknowledging that these topics are not included in Catholic doctrine. 
He quoted Saint Paul to illustrate the parallel between the initial perpetrator 
of sin and Christ the redeemer but felt no compulsion to invoke Saint Paul 
to justify belief in Adam as a single ancestor for all humanity.
Serving as a secular foil to Le Bachelet’s orthodoxy, Hermann Klaatsch 
became a notorious early twentieth century proponent of racial polygenism 
(Bowler 1986, 134–139). In 1910 he proposed that, although Propithecan-
thropi might be a common ancestor of apes, Neanderthals and modern 
humans, the lineages leading to modern human races have been distinct 
for long periods of time dating back to well before each of these lineages 
independently became human. Negroes, Australians, Pacific islanders and 
Aurignacians were claimed to have diverged into separate lineages at very 
different times and places: “That all have a common ultimate origin cannot 
be questioned—but it is very remote—as remote as the separation of the 
apes and man. We can say very little in the present state of science about the 
home of the common ancestor” (Klaatsch 1923, 107). Klaatsch attributed any 
multi-racial similarities to independent convergent evolution and claimed 
that he provided an objective perspective in contrast to religiously based 
assumptions of racial unity.
We may not be prepared to go so far as to trace the human race to two or more 
different roots, but we cannot deny that the recent tendency of anthropology 
is not to support the idea of the unity of the race that had been suggested by 
religious and sentimental considerations. Modern science cannot confirm the 
exaggerated humanitarianism which sees brothers and sisters in all the lower 
races (Klaatsch, 1923, 106–107).
Klaatsch presented these ideas at a 1910 Cologne Congress where, according 
to his editor Adolf Heilborn, “There were jokes about his supposed ‘conver-
sion from monogenetic Saul to polygenetic Paul’,” a quip which of course 
does not do justice to Saint Paul (Klaatsch, 1923, 27). Although Richard We-
gner wrote a receptive review of Klaatsch for Nature, Arthur Keith was more 
representative in his dismissal of Klaatsch’s views as rampant speculation 
and excessively dependent upon convergence (Keith 1910). Nevertheless, 
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Klaatsch’s notoriety was such that for many twentieth century writers 
the term “polygenism” continued to be associated with the hypothesis of 
independent evolution of human races from a set of non-human ancestors. 
Although this terminology was not uniform, the contrast between racial 
polygenism and the “unity of the human race” monogenism asserted by 
the Biblical Commission was firmly established.
Early twentieth century articles and books in keeping with the Biblical 
Commission’s 1909 decree were readily published and gave an appearance 
of a united voice. Catholic opposition to racial polygenism in accord with 
the “unity of the human race” certainly was not a point of controversy. 
However, on the broad topic of the “special creation of man,” exploratory 
hypotheses considered to be rash were generally kept out of print through 
communications from the Congregation of the Index. There is ample archival 
evidence that one hypothesis that was not welcomed was the idea that the 
initial human population was larger than a single pair of individuals. This 
position also gradually became known as polygenism although ambiguous 
terminology that confused it with racial polygenism was rampant. 
Among early twentieth century European Catholics trained in both 
science and theology, perhaps none was more influential in public discus-
sions of evolution than the Jesuit entomologist Erich Wasmann (Hofmann 
2020). In addition to his specialized study of myrmecophile ants and termites, 
Wasmann published and lectured on broader evolutionary topics shortly after 
the turn of the century. He argued for the extensive scope of descent with 
modification but also remained skeptical about extrapolation of empirically 
well-supported evolutionary lineages back to an origin in a single common 
ancestor. Instead, he proposed divine intervention for the production of 
“natural species” without ancestry. These natural species were subject to 
evolutionary change, resulting in extensive lineages of many descendent 
“systematic species.” In the terminology introduced by Haeckel, Wasmann 
defended polyphyletic evolution rather than monophyletic evolution or 
universal common descent. In general, he considered the determination of 
the number and time of origin of natural species to be subject to empirical 
research. He emphatically took human beings to be his paradigmatic example 
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of a natural species and rejected the hypothesis of a common ancestor 
for humans and apes as not yet sufficiently supported by fossil evidence. 
However, Wasmann also speculated that human origins might involve the 
introduction of a human soul into a body of pre-human ancestry and his 
private notes indicate that he harbored reservations about the Biblical 
Commission’s admonitions. In 1909 his Jesuit superior general, Xaver 
Wernz, warned Wasmann not to engage in any further writing or lecturing 
on this topic. Monophyletic evolution that included the descent of humanity 
from non-human ancestors had a controversial status in 1909 comparable 
to that of the Copernican hypothesis for Riccioli in 1651. Wasmann abided 
by Wernz’s order throughout the two decades prior to his death in 1931. 
This mandated silence was unfortunate since Wasmann would have been 
a well informed and articulate resource as the evidence for monophyletic 
evolution increased and Catholic discussions shifted to the possible doctrinal 
acceptability of human origins from a population rather than a single pair 
of individuals. Wasmann’s form of progressive creation by means of natural 
species was gradually abandoned in response to new empirical evidence 
and a more receptive theological climate. 
This shift in emphasis was not uniform and its irregular development is 
quite noticeable in French theological encyclopedias and journals. For exam-
ple, writing in 1911, the French Jesuit entomologist and historian Robert de 
Sinéty was still concerned about the scope of polyphyletic evolution. In 1906 
he had defended Wasmann’s measured approach against attacks by Haeckel 
and other German monists (de Sinéty 1906). De Sinéty now cited Wasmann 
as one of the “moderate transformists” whose position fell in between the 
two extremes of creationist “fixism” and “universal transformism” (de 
Sinéty 1911). Moderate transformism was polyphyletic and included the 
idea that natural species are divinely produced with a characteristic “organic 
perfection” that gives rise to differentiation along lineages of directly related 
systematic species. De Sinéty temporarily adopted Wasmann’s distinction 
between natural species and systematic species although he would later drop 
it as insufficiently operational. He also followed Wasmann in accepting the 
extensive evolutionary history of systematic species and he noted Wasmann’s 
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arguments for the gradual development of new species from varieties. For 
philosophical reasons, de Sinéty posed three propositions that were not 
acceptable extensions of well-confirmed lineages of evolutionary descent: 
the monist assertion of the origin of life through spontaneous generation, 
the monophyletic commitment to a single source for all animal and plant life, 
and the idea that humanity is purely the spontaneous product of evolution. 
De Sinéty agreed with Wasmann that, aside from human evolution, the 
scope of polyphyletic evolution is an empirical question and philosophers 
need to defer to scientific expertise. In the case of humanity, however, de 
Sinéty was convinced that the gap in mental capacity between animal and 
human is too large to attribute to descent from non-human ancestors. He 
also held that it was not theologically prudent to affirm that the natural 
evolution of the human body was complete prior to the introduction of 
a soul, although this opinion was not expressly forbidden; some physical 
transformation of the physical body prior to ensoulment should be reserved 
for divine intervention.
Both Wasmann and de Sinéty considered the paleontological and 
anatomical data to be inconclusive concerning human origins, even in light 
of new Cro-Magnon, Neanderthal and Pithecanthropus data. Among the 
numerous Neanderthal discoveries during this period, one of the most sig-
nificant was in La Chapelle-aux-Saints where the three Bouyssonie brothers 
had been excavating since 1905. Jean Bouyssonie had been a student of Jean 
Guibert at the Séminaire d’Issy during the 1890s. Ordained to the priesthood 
in 1901, he became professor of natural sciences at the Brive seminary in 
1905. His brother Amédée was also a priest and a theology instructor at Petit 
Séminaire, Lacabane. In 1908, together with their younger brother Paul, the 
Bouyssonies discovered a complete Neanderthal skeleton that had been 
deliberately buried in a low-ceilinged cave (Bouyssonie, Bouyssonie and 
Bardon 1908). In addition to anatomical arguments and tool evidence, the 
circumstances of the burial initially convinced the Bouyssonies that, instead 
of being a distinct species of Homo, Neanderthals were a human race with 
religious beliefs. Amédée was particularly assertive on this point, arguing 
that Adam and Eve were the ancestors of several human races: Neanderthals, 
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Cro-Magnons, and modern humans. He speculated that each of these races 
descended from a sub-population of early humans, descendants of Adam 
with a distinct set of characteristics (A. Bouyssonie 1911). Although Amédée 
maintained this hypothesis at least through 1913, he would abandon it 
in 1925 when he and Jean published a reassessment and concluded that 
Neanderthals were not human (Bouyssonie and Bouyssonie 1925). 
In 1912 the Bouyssonie brothers also contributed to a lengthy entry on 
“Homme” for the second volume of the Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi 
Catholique (d’Alès et al 1912). The discussion was divided into four separate 
essays. Adhémar d’Alès, the director of the Dictionnaire, wrote a section on 
Genesis, Henri Breuil joined the Bouyssonies to cover relevant developments 
in paleontology, Jean Guibert addressed the unity of the human race, and 
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin concluded with theological and philosophical 
issues. Teilhard’s essay is most relevant to the topic of polygenism, with the 
preceding sections providing theological and scientific context. 
Adhémar d’Alès, a Jesuit professor of theology at the Institut catholique 
in Paris, noted that the Genesis account gives no support to an evolutionary 
origin of humanity; the most direct reading would be that God directly 
created humanity without animal ancestry. Since no vestige of humanity’s 
supernatural creation and subsequent fall is available for scientific analysis, 
revelation serves as a secure basis for the believing Catholic. The strictly 
scientific account of pre-history by Henri Breuil and the two Bouyssonie 
brothers was primarily a survey of European fossils and artifacts. Breuil was 
an anthropologist specializing in cave art who would become a colleague 
of Teilhard beginning in Paris during the 1920s. He was a close companion 
of Jean Bouyssonie and had been his classmate in courses taught by Jean 
Guibert at the Séminaire d’Issy during the 1890s. Breuil and the Bouys-
sonies discussed Pithecanthropus, Neanderthal and Cro-Magnon material 
as well as scientific hypotheses for how they might be related to modern 
humans, possibly through a common ancestor. They also made a point of 
rejecting racial polygenism, as did Jean Guibert in his section on human 
unity. Guibert used the term “polygenist” or one of its variants only once, 
retaining a nineteenth century sense of the term as an assertion of several 
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distinct human species (Guibert 1912, col. 495). He painstakingly argued 
that there is no trait that can accurately delineate human races and that 
“there is no serious reason to suppose that the multiple races, whether 
historical or pre-historical, do not descend from a single initial couple” 
(Guibert 1912, col. 494). 
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s contribution to the “Homme” article 
marked the beginning of his life-long investigation of the science and 
faith interface. Unlike many of the more specialized Catholic theologians, 
he had direct scientific experience as a paleontologist from very early in 
his career. Between 1905 and 1908 he was an avid fossil collector while 
teaching physics and chemistry at a Jesuit high school in Cairo. In October 
of 1908 he began his concentrated study of theology at the Jesuit house at 
Hastings in Sussex, England, where he had instruction in dogmatic theology 
from Xavier-Marie Le Bachelet. Ironically, it was there that his interest 
in evolution was accelerated by reading Henri Bergson’s 1907 L’évolution 
créatrice, a volume made popular in England due to a 1911 translation as 
Creative Evolution (King 2013). At some point during this period, probably 
during 1908, Teilhard composed his section of the “Homme” article for the 
Dictionnaire apologétique (Teilhard de Chardin 1912). The essay reflects an 
early stage in his development and it conformed to a thoroughly acceptable 
Catholic position with respect to human evolution and monogenism. 
After summarizing the traditional Catholic doctrine of human nature as 
a composite of body and soul, and acknowledging that Genesis is written in 
a difficult genre to identify, Chardin stipulated two undeniable propositions 
(Teilhard de Chardin 1912, col. 505):
a) God has directly created the soul of the first man and probably thoroughly 
redesigned the material destined to form his body.
b) The human race descends entirely from a single couple (monogenism, which 
alone is compatible with the doctrine of original sin).
Even at this early date, Teilhard consistently used the term “monogenism” 
to refer to human descent from a single couple rather than in a nineteenth 
century sense of a single human lineage prior to racial diversification. Teil-
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hard commented that although there is no scientific problem in extending 
evolution to include humans, scripture does impose the constraints of 
monogenism and a discontinuity between humans and animals. Neverthe-
less, he was optimistic about the improbability of a conflict between science 
and doctrine. The difficulty in determining the exact scientific import of 
scripture, when combined with the lack of precision in paleontology and 
ancient anthropology, portends that scientific investigation confronts 
dogma with “nothing to fear or to hope” (Teilhard de Chardin 1912, col. 513). 
These expressions of a conventional mindset are not surprising considering 
Teilhard’s fledgling status within the Jesuits in 1909. At this point he did 
not suggest any hypothetical revisions to the doctrine of original sin if 
monogenism were to be acknowledged as scientifically untenable. 
Ordained on August 24 of 1911, Teilhard moved to Paris in October 1912 
to begin graduate study in paleontology under the direction of Marcellin 
Boule at the Museum of Natural History. He would eventually acquire 
his doctorate from the Sorbonne in 1924. His initial research included 
work with poorly catalogued dental and jawbone mammal fossils and the 
construction of tentative phylogenies for some of the carnivore lineages 
that now are dated from the Eocene through the end of the Oligocene 
(Teilhard de Chardin 1914–1915).2 In December of 1912, Arthur Smith 
Woodward and Charles Dawson announced what would become known 
as the infamous Piltdown skull, a fraudulent fabrication now generally 
attributed to Dawson (De Groote et al 2016). On a visit to England in the 
summer of 1913, Teilhard discovered a fossil tooth that contributed to 
the Piltdown controversy; the fabricated skull at the center of the affair 
was not established to be a hoax till 1953. Teilhard never attributed much 
importance to the specimen and suspected that it was a composite of two 
species (Teilhard de Chardin 1920). From December 1914 through March of 
1919 he served heroically as a stretcher bearer during some of the fiercest 
fighting of WWI. A total of 841 Jesuits were called into service and 164 of 
them were killed (Fouilloux 2005, 261). Many of those who survived were 
2 See de Bonis 2006.
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severely affected and upon returning to their religious communities they 
often felt stifled by the smug nineteenth century mentality exhibited by 
their older noncombatant superiors.
In 1920 Teilhard returned to Paris where he continued work on his 
dissertation. At this point he wrote a short composition on original sin 
dated 20 July that remained unpublished until after his death (Teilhard 
de Chardin 1971a). Here he set out the broad outline of the perspective he 
would periodically elaborate over the following three decades.
The principle obstacle encountered by orthodox thinkers when they try to 
accommodate the revealed historical picture of human origins to the present 
scientific evidence, is the traditional notion of original sin. It is the Pauline 
theory of the Fall and the two Adams which (somewhat illogically, we may add) 
makes it impossible to regard all the details found in Genesis as equally didactic 
and symbolic. It is that theory which is responsible for the jealous maintenance, 
as a dogma, of strict monogenism (first one man, and then one man and one 
woman), which it is in actual fact impossible for science to accept (Teilhard de 
Chardin 1971a, 36).
His alternative was to propose “an extensive metamorphosis of the notion of 
original sin,” a concept of universal scope untethered to one historical event.
[…] original sin, taken in its widest sense, is not a malady specific to the earth, 
nor is it bound up with human generation. It simply symbolizes the inevitable 
chance of evil (Necesse est ut eveniant scandala) which accompanies the existence 
of all participated being. Wherever being in fieri is produced, suffering and 
wrong immediately appear as its shadow: not only as a result of the tendency 
towards inaction and selfishness found in creatures, but also (which is more 
disturbing) as an inevitable concomitant of their effort to progress. (Teilhard 
de Chardin 1971a, 40).
Rather than a temporally located event attributed to a single pair of indi-
viduals, Teilhard now envisioned original sin as a concomitant condition 
of all creation.
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Original sin is the essential reaction of the finite to the creative act. Inevitably 
it insinuates itself into existence through the medium of all creation. It is the 
reverse side of all creation. By the very fact that he creates, God commits himself 
to a fight against evil and in consequence to, in one way or another, effecting 
a redemption (Teilhard de Chardin 1971a, 40).
Although these theological ideas were not widely distributed at the time, 
Teilhard also published several paleontology articles shortly after the war. 
Among these was a review of Les Hommes fossiles. Éléments de paléontologie 
humaine, a widely read 1921 volume written by his mentor, Marcellin Boule. 
While conceding that some of Boule’s terminology and inferences were not 
appropriate for Christians without some “explication,” Teilhard’s enthusiasm 
was obvious. He concluded that scientific research suggests that when the 
Genesis account refers to man being formed from “earth,” this should be 
understood as a prolonged effort of the entire universe, la totalité des choses 
(Teilhard de Chardin 1921, 577). Teilhard’s expansive sense of evolution was 
not at all typical of the time. For example, Henry de Dorlodot’s development 
of evolution by means of secondary causes in his 1921 book was considered 
controversial, but when it came to human evolution, even Dorlodot merely 
mentioned that: “We know from Revelation that all human beings actually 
living on the earth have sprung from one single couple. But revelation alone 
can give such details concerning origins” (Dorlodot 1922, 104–105).3 
In March of 1922, Teilhard began teaching geology at the Institut 
catholique in Paris, and it was at this point that he was invited to give 
a lecture on evolution for students at the Jesuit scholasticate in Enghien 
Belgium. When he included some comments on original sin, he was asked 
3 De Dorlodot reserved further discussion of human evolution for a second volume that he 
worked on during the early 1920s. He included discussion of possible human co-Adamites 
and pre-Adamites but, in contrast to Teilhard, he upheld monogenism by insisting that 
the supernatural aspect of humanity applied only to Adam and his descendants, the sole 
lineage responsible for modern humans. Although in 1925 the Holy Office prohibited 
publication of this volume, Ernest Messenger translated some sections and incorporated 
them into his 1932 book but without the co-Adamite and pre-Adamite material (Messen-
ger 1932). De Dorlodot’s draft was only discovered in 2006 and was published in Groes-
sens-van Dyck and Lambert, 2009. See also De Bont 2005.
8(2)/2020 117
CAT H O L I C I S M A N D E VO L U T I O N: PO LYG E N I S M A N D O R I G I N A L S I N
by Louis Riedinger, a theology faculty member, to write up a summary of 
his views. It is difficult to assess the immediate impact of the resulting 
“Note” since it is not known how widely it circulated and who studied it. It 
was not published until 1969 in Comment je crois, volume 10 of Teilhard’s 
collected works (Teilhard de Chardin 1971b). As he had done in his earlier 
1920 sketches, Teilhard pointed out the scientific improbability that the 
present human diversity could have resulted through descent from a single 
couple. The rejection of both monogenism and any idyllic prehistoric world 
without evil is presented as scientifically unavoidable.
As far as the mind can reach, looking backwards, we find the world dominated 
by physical evil, impregnated with moral evil (sin is manifestly ‘in potency’ close 
to actuality as soon as the least spontaneity appears) – we find it in a state of 
original sin (Teilhard de Chardin 1971b, 47).
Here Teilhard accepts the inevitability of evil wherever there is life or 
even inanimate matter almost in analogy to the degradation of energy 
in an entropic process subject to the second law of thermodynamics. His 
scientific mentality simply could not accommodate a literal interpretation 
of the Genesis account.
The truth is that it is so impossible to include Adam and the earthly paradise 
(taken literally) in our scientific outlook, that I wonder whether a single person 
today can at the same time focus his mind on the geological world presented 
by science, and on the world commonly described by sacred history (Teilhard 
de Chardin 1971b, 47).
In his concluding remarks, Teilhard again proposed original sin as a state 
coextensive with creation.
[…] we must so expand our ideas that we shall find it impossible to locate original 
sin at any one point in our whole environment, and will realize simply that it is 
everywhere, as closely woven into the being of the world as the God who creates 
us and the Incarnate Word who redeems us (Teilhard de Chardin 1971b, 54).
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In April of 1923 Teilhard departed for paleontological research in China 
as a collaborator with Father Émile Licent. There he had the spiritual 
experience that prompted his famous “Mass on the World.” By the time he 
returned to Paris in October 1924 an unknown informant had transmitted 
his “Note” on original sin to Rome where it ignited a firestorm of theological 
consternation. It is tempting to speculate that the “Note” was read by more 
theologians within the Roman curia than among Teilhard’s initial intended 
audience. After a meeting with the Lyons Jesuit provincial, Jean-Baptiste 
Costa de Beauregard, Teilhard’s contrite letter promising conformity was not 
enough to satisfy superior general Włodzimierz Ledóchowski. A list of six 
“propositions” were submitted to Teilhard for his signature of affirmation 
(Grumett and Bentley 2018; Kemp 2019; Grumett 2019). It is not clear who 
composed these propositions. They were included in a letter to Ledóchowski 
from Father Gabriel Huarte, theology professor at the Gregorian University 
in Rome. Since there is no documentary evidence to the contrary, Kenneth 
Kemp has argued that they may well have been composed by Huarte himself. 
Nor is there direct evidence of input from outside the Jesuits although 
informal interactions with the Roman curia cannot be ruled out. At any rate, 
the first four of the six propositions were vexing for Teilhard.
1) The first man, Adam, when he acted against God’s command in paradise, 
immediately lost that holiness and justice in which he had been created 
(Council of Trent, Session 5, Canon 1).
2) The sin of Adam damaged not only him alone but also his descendants; and 
the holiness and justice received from God, which he lost, he lost not only 
for himself alone but also for us (Council of Trent, Session 5, Canon 2).
3) This sin of Adam, which is one by origin and passed on to all by propaga-
tion and not by imitation, inheres in everyone as something proper to each 
(Council of Trent, Session 5, Canon 3).
4) Therefore the whole human race takes its origin from one protoparent, 
Adam (this fourth proposition is nowhere explicitly defined; but is clearly 
implied by the proceeding three) (Grumett and Bentley 2018, 314).
The fourth proposition certainly made Teilhard hesitate; it was in fact 
precisely the idea of monogenism, as Teilhard used the term. The English 
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translation of the proposition by Grumett and Bentley includes its paren-
thetical claim that it “is clearly implied by the proceeding three.” Teilhard 
may well have questioned that reasoning, and when he ultimately did sign 
on July 1, he did so with an interesting qualification above his signature.
I accept these propositions in the full sense that the Holy Church gives to them. 
And I sign them all the more voluntarily because, despite the appearances that 
I might have given, I have never had any other idea than to let them dominate 
all scientific truth (Grumett and Bentley 2018, 314).
These words were carefully chosen and there is an intriguing ambiguity about 
“the full sense that the Holy Church gives to them.” Suspicious of Teilhard’s 
resolve, Ledóchowski promptly terminated his teaching assignment at 
the Institut catholique and ordered him back to China. For Teilhard, the 
contrast between the invigorating depth of scientific discovery and mystical 
experience in China and the narrow confines of doctrinal orthodoxy back 
in Europe must have been insufferable. And yet he did tolerate it and he 
remained obedient to his superior general just as Wasmann had fifteen 
years earlier.
In sharp contrast to the originality of Teilhard’s unpublished explo-
rations, Xavier-Marie Le Bachelet wrote a thoroughly mundane essay on 
original sin for the Dictionnaire apologétique (Le Bachelet 1926). Drawing 
support from scripture and the Council of Trent, Le Bachelet presented the 
orthodox doctrine of original sin as the transmission of the effects of Adam’s 
sin to all humans through direct descent. He saw no reason to engage with 
scientific input based upon evolution. Asserting that theological synthesis 
with scientific research was not necessary, he simply referred his readers 
to the Dictionnaire apologétique articles on “Transformisme” and “Homme.”
The “Transformisme” entry was in fact written by Robert de Sinéty 
shortly after Teilhard’s return to China (de Sinéty 1928). Again, the contrast 
to Teilhard was considerable. While Teilhard had been inspired by Boule’s Les 
Hommes fossils, De Sinéty used it as an example of a theologically unaccept-
able line of reasoning. He then made a distinction between transformisme 
théiste généralisé and transformisme théiste mitigé. He argued in support of the 
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second of these two versions of theistic evolution in which God intervenes in 
the evolutionary process to bring about directed innovations in an unknown 
number of cases. As he had in his earlier discussion of Wasmann, de Sinéty 
made an effort to show that evidence for universal common descent by 
means of natural selection is not convincing. He drew heavily upon Louis 
Vialleton, a vitalist and professor of histology from the faculty of medicine 
in Montpellier. Vialleton had published a critique of Darwinian evolution in 
1924 that was negatively reviewed by Teilhard (Teilhard de Chardin 1925).
In his concluding remarks, de Sinéty posed a choice between human 
descent from a single couple or from a larger population, using monogenism 
and polygenism as labels for these two hypotheses. He noted that although 
a purely scientific perspective favored polygenism, he considered the 
required theological choice to be monogenism with God intervening not 
only to introduce the first human souls but also to modify in some manner 
the two pre-existing bodies in which the initial souls would function. In 
addition to retaining his earlier commitment to polyphyletic evolution, de 
Sinéty was explicit about the exclusive character of human origins through 
a single couple.
Man is not the product of evolution. His mental capacity, of an order essentially 
superior to that of a brute, requires a creative act of God at the origin of each 
human soul. No apodictic scientific argument can be opposed to the traditional 
thesis among Catholics according to which the Creator intervened in a special 
manner for the constitution of the initial human couple (De Sinéty 1928, col. 1847).
De Sinéty’s essay is a rare example of a terminological shift at the rela-
tively early date of 1928. Quite independent from any discussion of racial 
origins, he applied the terms monogenism and polygenism to the descent 
of humans from either a single couple or a larger population. Of course this 
sense of monogenism invoking Adam and Eve does imply the old sense of 
monogenism as the unity of the human race. However, the new sense of 
polygenism that attributes human origins to a population certainly does 
not imply the old sense of racial polygenism, the idea that human races are 
a plurality of deep evolutionary lineages that might even be distinct species.
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Meanwhile, after returning to China from research in Ethiopia, Teilhard 
experienced a spiritual and intellectual crisis that peaked during the first two 
months of 1929 (Cuénot 1965, 116–119). He emerged with a renewed sense 
of both liberation and acceptance of his dual role as a Jesuit and a scientist. 
Apparently inspired by this sense of equanimity, he wrote a bold essay in 
which he once again addressed the linkage between monogenism and the 
doctrine of original sin. Initially published in 1929 in a journal primarily 
intended for clergy in China (Teilhard de Chardin 1929), a reprint appeared 
in the much more widely read Revue des questions scientifiques (Teilhard de 
Chardin 1930). In a paragraph that raised some eyebrows, Teilhard bluntly 
stated the scientific unacceptability of monogenism.
If there is anything in modern scientific views that still greatly disturbs Catholic 
thought, it is not the possible derivation of man (a spiritual being) from the 
animals. It is the difficulty of making a plausible reconciliation between trans-
formism (once accepted) and a strict monogenism, that is to say our common 
descent from a single couple. On the one hand, for reasons which are not 
definitely philosophical or exegetic but essentially theological (the Pauline 
conception of the Fall and Redemption), the church clings to the historical 
reality of Adam and Eve. On the other, for reasons of probability and also 
comparative anatomy, science, left to itself, would never (to say the least of 
it) dream of attributing so narrow a basis as two individuals to the enormous 
edifice of humankind (Teilhard de Chardin 1966, 156).
In spite of this apparent impasse, Teilhard struck an optimistic note in 
predicting that as both science and theology progress “monogenesis will 
gradually, without losing any of its theological ‘effectiveness,’ assume a form 
fully satisfying our scientific requirements.”4 Whatever Teilhard may have 
meant by theological “effectiveness,” he clearly was hoping that the concept 
of monogenism could be transformed in such a way as to be compatible 
with the scientific evidence.
Kenneth Kemp has chronicled the flurry of correspondence, accusations, 
and reactions that transpired after the publication of this essay and several 
4 Translation by Kenneth Kemp, 2019, 944. 
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paleontological papers Teilhard wrote at this time (Kemp 2019, 942–947). 
In 1931, Ledóchowski, after learning from Donato Raffaele Sbaretti, the 
Secretary of the Holy Office, of numerous complaints about Teilhard’s 
publications, replied that future essays would be screened by two readers 
prior to publication, a requirement reiterated in 1934. The Franciscan 
Agostino Gemelli was a particularly persistent critic, sending frequent 
letters of protest to Rome. In May of 1931 he wrote a twenty-page letter to 
the Holy Office in which he warned that Teilhard’s view of human evolu-
tion from non-human ancestors was ill-advised and was not conclusively 
supported by the available scientific evidence. Gemelli had been the Italian 
translator of the last edition of Erich Wasmann’s book on evolution and 
had inserted his own conservative commentary. In his letter on Teilhard, 
Gemelli used Wasmann’s terminology of natural and systematic species to 
express the cautious position Wasmann had taken in print prior to being 
silenced (Kemp 2019, 15). At this point Gemelli was not alone in fighting 
a rearguard campaign against not only polygenism but monophyletic 
evolution as well. 
Polygenism certainly was not the primary concern for all theologians 
interested in human evolution. Ernest Messenger hardly mentioned it in 
his widely discussed 1932 book, commenting only that “St. Paul would have 
led the Church into error on a matter concerning the essential mission of 
the Church, if there were in existence men who, in point of fact, were not 
descended from Adam” (Messenger 1932, 944). Similarly, when Thomas 
Motherway surveyed the numerous critiques of Messenger’s book published 
during 1932 and 1933, he concentrated on whether or not divine intervention 
was required to prepare Adam’s body for ensoulment. The presumption that 
Adam was a single person was not even mentioned except in reference to 
the 1909 mandate of the Biblical Commission (Motherway 1944).
Auguste Gaudel did briefly take up the issue in his article on original sin 
for the Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique. Following a detailed account of 
the history of the doctrine, Gaudel quoted Teilhard’s 1930 statement of the 
opposition between scientific methodology and monogenism and granted 
that this appeared to be a serious difficulty. He insisted that monogenism 
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was the Church’s position and confidently assured his readers that, as long as 
theologians and scientists remained in their proper domains and scientists 
did not advance mere hypotheses as established truths, “faith assures us that 
there will be no contradiction between our creed and human knowledge” 
(Gaudel, 1933, col. 591).
Two years later, Jean and Amédée Bouyssonie took a less conventional 
and more open-ended approach in their “Polygénisme” article for the 
Dictionnaire de théologie catholique. In 1925 they had abandoned their 
earlier assertion of the humanity of Neanderthals and had also disagreed 
with Teilhard’s claims that the role of mutation in evolutionary change 
necessarily supports polygenism (Bouyssonie and Bouyssonie 1925, 110). 
By 1935 they had become more receptive to polygenism and their article 
would become a focal point for future debate. In contrast to Robert de Sinéty 
and Teilhard, they began with a definition inherited from the nineteenth 
century dispute over racial unity: “Polygenism may be defined as a theory 
that considers humanity to be composed of groups having different origins” 
(Bouyssonie and Bouyssonie 1935, col. 2520). After surveying some of the 
history of that argument, the Bouyssonies dismissed the conclusions of 
racial polygenists such as Klaatsch as mostly speculation. They agreed with 
Henri Vallois, a well-respected French anthropologist and paleontologist, 
who during the late 1920s was an articulate defender of the monophyletic 
makeup of humans (Vallois 1927). Vallois was adamant that comparative 
anatomy thoroughly demonstrates that modern humanity is one species and 
distinct from Neanderthals. Based upon their own first-hand experience with 
Neanderthal fossils and artifacts, it had been difficult for the Bouyssonies not 
to consider them human. However, they also realized that if Homo sapiens 
and human Neanderthals were descended from a non-human common 
ancestor, that would mean that some humans would not have Adam as an 
ancestor. Although the Neanderthal lineage eventually went extinct, there 
was a danger that a belief in human Neanderthals would be found contrary 
to the doctrine of original sin. They left this issue undecided for the present 
since the scientific evidence was still inconclusive on the structure and 
timing of the relevant phylogeny.
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Turning to more recent discussions of monogenism, the Bouyssonies 
cited both Teilhard and Robert de Sinéty for arguments that a purely scien-
tific approach excludes all but the slimmest possibility of human descent 
from just two forebears. They then concluded by posing a pair of rather 
daring hypothetical questions for further consideration. 
Might it be that original sin is due to a more or less large collectivity rather than 
a single couple, and, if this is the case, might not all humanity still be descended 
from these first sinners? Secondly, might the analogies drawn by Saint Paul 
between the first Adam, father of the human race, and the new Adam, Jesus 
Christ, be more relevant to the universal and hereditary culpability of humanity 
and its redemption rather than to its community of origin? (Bouyssonie and 
Bouyssonie 1935, col 2536)
These were not purely rhetorical questions; they offered polygenism as 
a viable option that Wasmann and Teilhard, among others, had been for-
bidden to discuss. In avoiding censorship, the fact that Jean and Amédée 
Bouyssonie were not members of a religious order may have worked to their 
advantage, but their provocative questions did not go unnoticed.
Writing after WWII, the Dominican biblical theologian Francis Ceup-
pens indignantly objected to how the Bouysonnies had posed suggestive 
questions without providing orthodox answers. He also took umbrage at 
the blasé manner in which Teilhard had assumed the scientific necessity of 
polygenism in his 1930 essay. Ceuppens emphasized the tentative nature 
of scientific conclusions, based as they always are on incomplete evidence. 
After summarizing his reading of Genesis 1–3, he drew his own unequivocal 
conclusion regarding polygenesis.
At the origin: God created only two human beings, Adam and Eve, and from 
these two persons descended by means of generation, all other men; Adam and 
Eve are the proto-parents of all humanity, (Gen III, 20); from that follows the 
unity of the human race, directly opposed to polygenism (Ceuppens 1947, 28).
For Ceuppens, a correct reading of Genesis rules out polygenesis even though 
it is possible that evolutionary processes brought about the pre-human 
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animal body that God then transformed into the first ensouled human 
body. Furthermore, monogenesis follows from the doctrine of original sin 
propounded by Saint Paul. “Original sin is not the deed of a more or less 
numerous collective, but the deed of one alone, Adam, father of the human 
race” (Ceuppens 1947, 31). Ceuppens concluded by providing what he 
considered to be the appropriate answers to the questions the Bouysonnies 
had posed. 
1. According to the doctrine of Saint Paul to the Romans, original sin is not 
the deed of a more or less numerous collective but is the deed of a unique 
Genesis couple from which, according to Genesis, all humanity descends 
through generation.
2. Saint Paul, through his analogies, certainly teaches the universal and hered-
itary culpability of the entire human race as well as its integral redemption, 
but he also insists, in a quite specific manner, on the common origin of 
this very humanity, a common origin which he assumes to be known to his 
readers, as is clearly taught in Genesis (Ceuppens 1947, 32).
Ceuppens’ answers to the Bouysonnies’ questions amounted to a synopsis 
of conventional theology on the topic. It may be that, in so thoroughly and 
dogmatically objecting to the Bouysonnies and Teilhard, Ceuppens brought 
more attention to their essays than they might otherwise have received.
Ceuppens’ perspective was shared by Abbé Émile Amann when he wrote 
the article on evolution for the Dictionnaire de théologie catholique. A theolo-
gian at the University of Strasbourg, Amann had taken over as director of the 
Dictionnaire in 1922 and gradually moderated the anti-modernist orientation 
typical of the volumes published earlier in the century (Fouilloux 2014). Al-
though in 1907 he had been removed from his teaching position at the Nancy 
seminary due to his course on evolution, he now conformed to the expected 
constraints. After summarizing some of the history of evolutionary thinking 
and theological responses, he concluded that: “in the present state of theo-
logical science, it would appear at least rash (téméraire), not to say erroneous, 
to contest the descent of our humanity from a single couple” (Amann 1946, 
col. 1390). Furthermore, concerning the current consensus of theologians:
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In fact, they are almost unanimous in excluding as inadmissible the hypothesis 
of polygenism and even a monogenism that would ascribe the origins of our 
humanity, not to a single couple, but to a single human group. It would therefore 
appear difficult to envision any attempt at a solution in which original sin would 
be a collective act (Amann 1946, col. 1391).
Once again, the terminology is potentially confusing. Amann refers to the 
hypothesis of the origins of humanity in “a single human group” as a form 
of monogenism, albeit one that would be rash to assert. For Teilhard and 
Robert de Sinéty, this scenario was in fact the version of polygenism most 
supported by science, and it would become the polygenetic hypothesis most 
under theological scrutiny after 1950.
In 1947 Teilhard returned to the theme of original sin in another essay 
that remained unpublished until 1969. After reiterating his view of original 
sin as “a reality that belongs to the trans-historic order” (Teilhard de Chardin 
1971c, 188–189), he concluded that this sense of original sin, inseparable 
from creation,
[…] entirely respects Christian thought and the customary Christian approach – 
the only corrective it contributes, in short, being to substitute a collective ‘matrix’ 
and a collective heredity for the womb of our mother Eve. And this, incidentally, 
has the further result of releasing us from the necessity (progressively more 
unacceptable) of having, illogically, to derive the whole human race from one 
single couple (Teilhard de Chardin 1971c, 197).
It is hardly surprising that this essay was not published at the time of 
composition. The “corrective” Teilhard now proposed did not have mono-
genism merely “assume a different form,” as he had hoped back in 1929; it 
was simply replaced by polygenism. Yet Teilhard mentioned in a footnote 
that “the theological side of the explanation offered here has been upheld 
in Lyons by Pere Rondet” (Teilhard de Chardin 1971c, 197).
Teilhard’s reference to Henri Rondet links the topics of original sin 
and polygenism to a far broader theological conflict. By the mid-1930s, 
prominent French theologians were calling for a revitalized theology that 
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would be more engaged with active spiritual life. In particular, Dominicans 
such as Yves Congar and Marie-Dominique Chenu proposed a renewed 
attention to historical sources and a sensitivity to the cultural context of 
spiritual experience that would make theology independent from scholastic 
methodology and terminology.5 During the 1940s, the movement was labelled 
nouvelle théologie, initially with negative implications, as was the case with the 
“modernism” label at the beginning of the century. By this point the center 
of innovation shifted to Jesuits such as Jean Daniélou and Henri de Lubac.
Henri Rondet contributed to nouvelle théologie as Prefect of Studies at 
the Lyon-Fourvière Jesuit house. Copies of Teilhard’s unpublished essays 
circulated freely there, much to the consternation of the Jesuit Superior 
General (Avon 2005). As Teilhard noted, Rondet was indeed primarily 
concerned with the “theological side” of the original sin concept. While he 
acknowledged the “mystery” of original sin, his studiously vague references 
to Adam were primarily incorporated into an exploration of how the history 
of philosophy depicts human confrontation with good and evil; he did not 
explore implications of paleontology (Rondet 1946). However, Rondet also 
wrote a Socratic dialogue reminiscent of Galileo’s 1632 Dialogue on the 
Two Chief World Systems, although on a much smaller scale. Here Rondet 
imagined a spirited conversation in which an astute and well-read Catholic 
seeks council from a sympathetic clerical advisor on how best to reconcile 
scientific conclusions with Catholic doctrine. When the conversation turns 
to original sin, the priest admits that, although the majority of theologians 
profess monogenism, some quietly prefer polygenism, the overwhelming 
choice of scientists. His interlocutor has read Robert de Sinéty’s article 
“Transformisme” and is troubled by the conflict with original sin that 
polygenism generates when evolutionary theory is applied to human 
beings. The advisor recommends the article by the Bouyssonies in the 
“more liberal” Dictionnaire de théologie catholique and quotes their two 
provocative questions in full. While granting that raising these questions 
might be considered theologically rash, he finds them worthy of further 
5 See Nichols 2000, Kirwan 2018, and Mettepenningen 2010.
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consideration. Ultimately, he advises patience: “The most serious difficulties 
against the ordinary formulation of the dogma of original sin come less from 
paleontology or ethnology than from biblical criticism and the comparative 
history of religions” (Rondet 1943, 980). Furthermore, even if polygenism 
should be demonstrated as indubitably true, “the dogma of an original 
sin would remain absolutely intact” (Rondet 1943, 979). Writing from the 
relatively safe shelter of a fictional dialogue, Rondet may well have been 
paraphrasing conversations he entertained as Prefect of Studies at Four-
vière. In the absence of any definitive pronouncements from the Vatican, 
his imaginary advisor could acknowledge the guidelines imposed by the 
Biblical Commission but also claim that scientific support for polygenism 
does not pose a threat to original sin doctrine, properly understood. The 
tacit implication was that the doctrine needed to be clarified; Rondet himself 
would not return to the topic until after Vatican II.
Jean Daniélou was willing to make a more explicit call for immediate 
theological renewal. Writing in the Jesuit journal Études, where he served 
as editor, Daniélou praised Teilhard for compelling Christians to embrace 
evolutionary perspectives.
The broad lines of his system, according to which history is progressively raised 
from the biological world to that of thought, and from the world of thought to 
that of Christ, and which furthermore reconnect with the views of the Fathers, 
will persist as established (Daniélou 1946, 15).
It was Teilhard’s sensitivity to historical process that for Daniélou was such 
a welcome contrast to the scholastic theology of the age, a “mummification 
of thought that remained fixed in its scholastic forms and had lost contact 
with the development of philosophy and science” (Daniélou 1946, 6). In 
particular, a modern understanding of the doctrine of original sin should 
concentrate upon just three central ideas: “that man before Christ is in 
a state of sin; that human freedom bears responsibility for this sin, and 
that men are in solidarity with respect to this sin” (Daniélou 1946, 15). It 
is in this context that the Christian experience of the apparently absurd 
coexistence of good and evil finds vivid expression in modern philosophy, 
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especially existentialism. To engage productively with the modern world, 
theology must draw upon all its resources, ranging from Saints Ireneus and 
Augustine, to Teilhard and Kierkegaard (Daniélou 1946, 16).
Daniélou’s essay became a lightning rod for Jesuit praise and Dominican 
condemnation. While formal theological clarification from the Vatican was 
not to be expected in the midst of WWII, shortly thereafter a concerted 
Dominican attack on nouvelle théologie came from Thomists such as Ma-
rie-Michel Labourdette who defended the primacy of Thomistic metaphysics 
as an essential foundation for the explication of the unchanging truths 
of revelation (Fouilloux 1995). Of particular import for the polygenism 
issue was the more aggressive critique by Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, 
an authoritative fixture at the Angelicum in Rome, where he taught from 
1909 to 1960. As a stalwart Thomist, he characterized nouvelle théologie as 
a revival of modernist errors (Garrigou-Lagrange 1930). He found particularly 
objectionable the idea that Catholic doctrine is a developmental symbolic 
representation of religious aspiration contingent upon changing cultural 
and philosophical conceptual systems for its legitimate expression. Garri-
gou-Lagrange insisted upon a stable bedrock of revealed truths accurately 
understood through Aristotelian metaphysics. In 1946 he wrote a stern 
condemnation of nouvelle théologie in which he used the erosion of the 
doctrine of original sin as one of his primary examples of the consequences 
of holding theological truth hostage to philosophical expression. He had 
been scandalized by the unauthorized circulation of type-written theolog-
ical essays in which “Adam seems not to be an individual man from which 
the human race descends, but rather a collectivity,” a view he took to be 
irreconcilable with Saint Paul’s doctrine of original sin (Garrigou-Lagrange 
1946, 135). He quoted a long passage from Teilhard’s clandestinely circulated 
essay “How I believe” in which Teilhard developed an evolutionary sense 
of the incarnation as a teleological approach toward the universal cosmic 
centre.6 Garrigou-Lagrange considered these ideas delusional results of 
losing touch with the unchanging truth of permanent doctrine.
6 Written in 1934, Teilhard’s essay was eventually published in Comment je crois, volume 10 
of his collected works, in 1969. The passage quoted by Garrigou-Lagrange is also in the 
1971 English edition, Christianity and Evolution, 127–128.
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The Incarnation of the Word, the mystical body, the universal Christ, thus 
would be mere moments of evolution, and from this perspective of a constant 
progress from the origin, it would not appear that there would have been a fall 
at the beginning of the history of humanity, but a constant progress of good 
triumphing over evil according to the very laws of evolution. Original sin in us 
would be the consequence of the faults of men who have exerted a dark influence 
upon humanity (Garrigou-Lagrange 1946, 138).
In 1948 Garrigou-Lagrange reiterated his opposition to the polygenetic 
opinion that “Adam can be interpreted as a collective name rather than as an 
individual” (Garrigou-Lagrange 1948, 191). His misleading gloss of polygen-
ism was that “If polygenism were true, there would have been several initial 
men in very different regions of our terrestrial globe, any place where higher 
primates were sufficiently evolved” (Garrigou-Lagrange 1948, 197). This 
polyphyletic sense of polygenism was of course not a necessary consequence 
of rejecting monogenism. Although Teilhard’s monophyletic polygenism 
was a more relevant option, Garrigou-Lagrange seems to have lapsed into 
the polyphyletic terminology of nineteenth century racial polygenism. At 
any rate, he agreed with Ceuppens that Saint Paul attributed original sin to 
an individual, as confirmed by the Council of Trent, the exegetical tradition, 
and the 1909 decree of the Biblical Commission. To hold that “Adam” is 
actually a reference to more than one person would be to say that all these 
sources “have not positively taught what they appeared to teach according to 
the obvious and literal sense of their words” (Garrigou-Lagrange 1948, 195). 
If polygenism were true, the Holy Spirit would in effect have preserved an 
error in the writings of all those who have taught monogenism as the correct 
theological doctrine. Garrigou-Lagrange gave no thought to subordinating 
theology to the authority of the natural sciences. Furthermore, he was 
skeptical about any significant unmediated evolutionary progression, that 
is, the descent of a “higher” species from a “lower” one. Such a transition 
would violate the metaphysical principal that an effect cannot have a higher 
degree of perfection than its cause. Given the shortcomings of the science 
that provides the grounding for polygenesis, he labelled evolution simply 
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a hypothesis rather than an established fact. Since science cannot establish 
polygenism with certitude, why should it be adopted in clear contradiction 
with scriptural revelation? On the other hand, concerning monogenism, 
“according to the majority of theologians, it is explicitly revealed in specific 
scriptural texts, implicitly in others, and virtually in the dogma of original 
sin” (Garrigou-Lagrange 1948, 196). In short, “according to scripture, tra-
dition, and theology, monogenism appears increasingly as a truth proxima 
fidei,” a doctrine accepted by most theologians as a revealed truth but 
not yet ruled upon as such by the Church (Garrigou-Lagrange 1948, 202). 
Preserving the traditional role of monogenism in the doctrine of original sin 
was essential to Garrigou-Lagrange’s energetic attack on nouvelle théologie 
and motivated him to encourage an authoritative pronouncement from the 
Vatican. Directives from Rome resulted in strictures against the Fourvière 
Jesuits carried out by their Superior General, Jean-Baptiste Janssens, es-
pecially in 1950. Rondet was forced to resign as editor of Études and also 
would lose his position as Prefect of Studies in 1951.
In spite of this hostile environment and the energy spent in silencing 
Teilhard, favorable discussions of polygenism proliferated. Philip Donnelly 
commented that: “In the past fifteen years there has been a growing inclina-
tion among some French Catholic scholars toward polygenism and toward 
attempts at reconciling this scientific hypothesis with Genesis” (Donnelly 
1949, 433). As examples, Donnelly mentioned the Bouyssonie brothers, 
Jean Guitton, René Boigelot, Henri Rondet, André-Marie Dubarle, and 
Dominique Dubarle. In one respect, Donnelly’s comment was inaccurate in 
that the primary focus for efforts to resolve the polygenism issue were more 
focused on original sin doctrine than on Genesis itself. There is also reason 
to believe that this choice was encouraged by seemingly unrelated events in 
Rome during the 1940s. The years directly following 1942 included several 
high-profile lectures and publications to mark the tricentennial of Galileo’s 
death (Finocchiaro 2005, 275–294). Galileo was enthusiastically acclaimed 
for his piety and his faithful submission to the verdict of a misguided trial. 
In a widely distributed lecture and publication, the Jesuit Filippo Soccorso 
found fault with the theologians who had attributed scientific authority to 
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scripture and mistakenly inferred a conflict with Copernican astronomy. Pius 
XII surely took note of this assessment and would avoid a similar mistake 
with respect to polygenism; he would express his concerns in the context 
of doctrine rather than Genesis.
The relevant terminology still had not become standardized. In a 1949 
article, Joseph Bataini contrasted two groups, the first, “hominids more or 
less similar to us,” including modern humans and Cro-Magnons, and the 
second, “those who present profound differences from us,” including Nean-
derthals and Homo erectus. He then claimed that proponents of monogenism 
would characterize the two groups as races while from the viewpoint of 
polygenism they would be species (Bataini 1949, 189). This is a puzzling 
assertion in that it would have monogenism imply not just that all modern 
humans are part of the same species but also that only a racial distinction 
separates them from Neanderthals and Homo erectus; polygenism would 
simply make the Neanderthal and Homo erectus group a separate species 
from the modern human group. Bataini presented examples of scientists 
and theologians who allegedly favored either monogenism or polygenism 
without noting that they did not use these terms in the sense that he had 
defined them. In effect, midway through his article, he implicitly shifted 
to an updated and more useful understanding of monogenism as the view 
that all humans descend from a single couple. He concluded that scientific 
research had not absolutely ruled out monogenism while theological and 
exegetical arguments had not yet established it as revealed truth. When he 
revisited the issue in 1950, he rejected A. Mancini’s hypothesis that God 
ensouled a large population out of which one couple sinned and passed 
the consequences on to their descendants (Bataini 1950). Bataini himself 
remained loyal to the monogenism of a single initial human couple. 
A final example of Catholic thinking about polygenism just prior to 
Humani generis appeared in the initial French edition of Jacques de Bivort 
de La Saudée’s widely read anthology of scientific and theological essays, 
Essai sur Dieu, l’Homme et l’Univers. In a chapter on human origins and the 
fossil record, Georges Vandebroek, the Louvain professor of comparative 
anatomy and anthropology, summarized the evidence for human evolution 
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and noted the complexity of data provided by the large number of newly 
discovered specimens, especially Homo neanderthalensis and Homo erectus. 
His concluding remarks included the common retention of nineteenth 
century terminology.
In the eyes of certain biologists, these considerations might suggest the idea of 
polygenism, namely the scientific theory that the various human races derive 
from parallel lines that separated from a common stock before attaining the 
human level. But this, it must be said, is a theory for which at present there is 
no shadow of scientific proof. A sounder conception is that all the hominids 
derive from a single stock that had already attained a human level, and thereafter 
various lines would have become rapidly established, all more or less parallel. 
They produced the different fossil and present-day types. This is a form of 
monogenism (Vandebroek 1953, 140).
Here Vandebroek still used the terms polygenism and monogenism much 
as they had often been used in the nineteenth century. The version of 
“monogenism” he preferred had humanity descending from a single “stock” 
(souche), but not necessarily from a single couple; as was the case in Amann’s 
1946 discussion, this excessively inclusive definition actually allowed for the 
possibility of polygenism in the sense that Teilhard and Robert de Sinéty 
used the term.
The immediate context for Humani generis clearly included a growing 
undercurrent of receptivity to polygenism even if it was not expressed with 
terminological precision. Garrigou-Lagrange’s strong opposition was also 
well-known. As historian Michael Kerlin has argued, although there is no 
direct evidence that Garrigou-Lagrange helped to ghost-write the encyclical, 
“it is plain that he had a major role in its gestation” (Kerlin 2007, 111). Just 
as Pius X’s Pascendi condemned “modernism” in 1907, Humani generis took 
aim at nouvelle théologie and would make manifest Garrigou-Lagrange’s 
conviction that polygenism was not a theologically acceptable facet of 
human evolution. 
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